Introduction
In-service inspection plays a vital role in ensuring the safe operation of nuclear plants. It is, therefore, essential that the effectiveness of the inspection system is properly understood and achieves the intended performance in practice. In Europe, this is ensured by means of inspection qualification, which is widely performed in accordance with the European Network for Inspection and Qualification (ENIQ) methodology [1] . The inspection locations, frequencies and methods have traditionally been based primarily on the type and safety category of the equipment determined from the original design basis. However, improvements in probabilistic safety assessments combined with many years' operating experience have resulted in increasing interest in the adoption of risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI).
Although the consequence of failure is not influenced by inspection, the probability of failure is. The effectiveness of inspection is, therefore, an important input for RI-ISI analysis. If a quantitative RI-ISI analysis is to be performed, then a quantitative measure of inspection effectiveness is needed in order to calculate the reduction in risk associated with inspection. A Probability of Detection (POD) curve would provide ideal data.
POD data is normally generated by performing practical trials on a large number of defects in test-pieces. The probability of detection is then plotted against an appropriate defect parameter, such as through-wall extent. From statistics, a minimum of 29 defects with the same parameter all need to be detected in order to establish a 90% probability of detection at a lower bound confidence of 95%, and this to provide just one point on the POD curve. Further, it can be technically very hard if not impossible to manufacture artificial defects truly representative of real ones.
In recognition of these limitations, the ENIQ approach to inspection qualification is based on a combination of technical justification and test-piece trials. Technical justification involves assembling supporting evidence for inspection capability (results of capability evaluation exercises, feedback from site experience, theoretical models, physical reasoning). The output from the ENIQ qualification process is typically a statement concluding whether or not there is high confidence that the required inspection capability will be achieved in practice, for the inspection system, component and defect range. However, the ENIQ methodology is not designed to provide a quantitative measure of inspection capability of the type which can be used by quantitative RI-ISI.
In view of these considerations, a project was set up to investigate and demonstrate via pilot studies approaches to quantify the confidence which comes from inspection qualification. Further, the project aimed at developing guidelines on how to relate inspection qualification results, risk reduction and inspection interval. The project was led by Doosan Babcock in cooperation with VTT and the Institute for Energy of the European Commission Joint Research Centre. This paper describes the work performed and results obtained in this project. For a more complete description of the project, see [2] .
Sensitivity of risk reduction to POD curves level and detail
The sensitivity of risk to POD was investigated using two different approaches: firstly, without taking into consideration the initiation and growth of flaws, and secondly, taking this into account together with inspection intervals. The results obtained using the first approach are reported in detail in [3] , and only briefly summarised here. If risk is defined as: where pof is the probability of failure and cof the consequence of that failure, a risk reduction percentage, R, can be defined as: where pof without is the probability of failure without inspection, and pof with is the probability of failure with inspection. This is because the inspection programme will only affect the probability of failure. As an inspection is carried out, knowledge regarding the previously uncertain state of the plant is gathered, and the calculated probability of failure is (usually) reduced. The consequence of failure, depending on many factors such as plant layout, presence of redundant or mitigating systems, will not be affected by the inspection.
If the following functions are considered (with a being the flaw size normalised to the wall thickness): q A probability distribution of flaw size, λ(a) q A function expressing the probability of failure as a function of flaw size, φ(a) q A POD curve, p(a) it is straightforward to calculate the probability of failure without inspection, pof without , by integrating λ(a)×φ(a) over the flaw size: And, since 1-p(a) is the probability of missing a defect of size a, the probability of failure with inspection, pof with , is given by: The risk reduction percentage expressed in Eq (2) can, therefore, be evaluated and was used to study the influence of different types of POD curve on risk reduction, as a function of defect distribution and material toughness (sensitivity of failure probability to flaw size).
The integrals in Eqs (3) and (4) are very straightforward to calculate numerically. The difficulty is shifted to determining the three functions λ(a), φ(a) and p(a). In our study, a truncated exponential distribution was chosen to represent the probability distribution of flaw size, λ(a) with parameter μ. The probability of failure was modelled using the cumulative Beta distribution with parameters α and β. The POD curve, p(a), was modelled using simple step functions, thus assuming a POD of 0 for all crack sizes below a certain threshold depth a th , and equal to a plateau value p pl for a > a th , Figure 1 .
Three base cases were defined for the probability distribution of flaw size (μ=0.01, 0.1 and 10) and three for the probability of failure function (α=1, β=1; α=10, β=100 and α=100, β=10), for a total of nine possible combinations. Risk reduction was then calculated for all the base cases using families of step-curve PODs characterised by varying p pl and a th .
An example of the curves obtained is provided in Figure 2 (case μ=0.01 and α=100, β=10), which is possibly the most representative of a component in a nuclear plant.
Curves such as these can be used to make a choice on how the resources allocated to the design and qualification of an inspection system could be employed. Different strategies could be envisaged, for instance for a given, fixed p pl (which could be more or less intrinsic for the chosen NDE system), the curves could be used to determine which a th (ie which target defect qualification size) should be used to obtain a desired risk reduction.
To investigate the effects of POD on inspection intervals, a second approach was investigated, based on Markov processes. A Markov process is a stochastic process in which the probability distribution of the current state is conditionally independent of the path of past states, a characteristic called the Markov property. In this work, the states of the Markov process corresponded to crack penetration depths in the material, and the transition probabilities from a lower state to higher states (deeper cracks). The effects of inspections were included in the model as transitions from a crack state to a flawless state. A similar approach to study inspection strategies using Markov models has been suggested in [4] . The main novelty introduced here was the use of probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) to generate transition probabilities to model the crack growth [5] . The principle of a simple Markov model is illustrated in Figure  3 , where we defined the following states: 0 = no detectable flaw, 1 = a detectable flaw, 2 = detectable leak, 3 = rupture. λ ij and μ ij are the transition rates (or probabilities) per cycle from state i to state j. λ ij symbolise growth rates, while μ ij describe detection and repair rates.
Transition probabilities from one state to the other higher states were generated from the results of the PFM simulations by recording the flaw depth once a year, and assigning the size to a state representing a certain range of depths. The data expressed how many years had been spent in each of these states, and if there was a transition to a higher state.
The approach was applied to various degradation mechanisms and POD step functions, as summarised in [2] . Figure 4 reports the result obtained in the example covering stress corrosion cracking, and shows the yearly rupture probabilities for three cases: without inspections, inspections at 10 years interval with POD 0.9 for cracks exceeding 20% of the wall thickness (POD1), and inspections with 8 years interval with POD 0.8 (POD2). In both cases the POD is 0 for cracks smaller than 20% of the wall thickness. In this case, where we have no manufacturing flaws, the cracks are initiated according to a frequency and size distribution estimated from Swedish experience data, and the annual rupture probability is an increasing function.
The mean yearly rupture probability for the case without inspections was 3.7·10 -5 , for POD1 it was 2.3·10 -6 , and for POD2 2.4·10 -6 . Thus a similar yearly rupture probability was achieved by shortening the inspection interval for the lower quality inspection.
Approaches to quantify the confidence associated to inspection qualification
Three approaches to quantify the inspection capability based on inspection qualification were considered. In the following we describe a direct judgement method, and a Bayesian approach including a weighting and scoring of various parts of the evidence presented in the technical justification. A description of the third approach, based on the relationship between POD and margin of detection, can be found in [6] .
Direct expert judgement of POD
A simple POD curve could be used as the target for inspection qualification, or a simple POD curve could be requested as the output from qualification. The task of the qualification body (QB) would be easier for simpler POD curve shapes. In this case the qualification body would be simply asked to judge whether, on the basis of the qualification evidence provided, the inspection system would for example detect at least X% of defects exceeding a given size (and within the specified range of orientations, locations, shapes etc). Even if the qualification body does not feel able to confirm that the inspection system will meet the target POD, it would still be useful to know what POD the QB agrees can be considered a lower bound. This approach consists of directly eliciting from the experts of the QB a quantitative judgement on the POD. We proposed to use a table such as Table 1 . First of all, it is important to clearly identify at which confidence levels the POD judgement is required, since at a very low confidence level the judgement could be very well approaching 1, but this would be a rather useless insight. We proposed to use two different confidence levels, 80% and 95%.
The table is submitted to the QB, to be completed by the QB members working as a team, or independently before meeting to compare and discuss the results. First, the QB members should judge whether the POD exceeds some low level (for instance, 50%). The QB would then move on to a slightly higher level (such as 60%) and repeat the process, until some POD level is reached which the QB feels unable to confirm. This process is then repeated for the second confidence level. The higher the POD value used as the target for qualification, the more difficult it will be for the qualification body to be confident that the inspection system meets this target. Lowering the target will simplify matters, but at the expense of reducing the risk reduction which can be credited. The main problem facing the qualification body is in knowing how to relate evidence on inspection capability to a POD value.
The advantage of this direct method is that it is relatively straightforward to implement, provided that the QB members are properly trained to understand simple concepts such as confidence levels. The user must always bear in mind that the numbers provided are based on expert judgement and not in rigorous statistical analysis of experimental data.
Bayesian methodology for the quantification of the ENIQ methodology
Another method investigated was based on a Bayesian approach, where the 'confidence' in the technical justification is expressed in probabilistic terms [7, 8] . Bayesian statistics is particularly appealing because it offers a formal way of treating subjective probabilities (for example expert judgment). According to this interpretation, probability is a subjective degree of belief about events based on the available evidence. The initial degree of belief regarding an unknown variable is represented with a prior distribution. Using Bayes' theorem, the prior distribution is updated as new evidence becomes available. The resulting distribution is called the posterior distribution.
We consider a population of defects characterised by a single, fixed flaw size, a, and we assume that all the variables, such as component type and material, acting damage mechanism, the defect attributes (morphology, etc) and the NDT system that is to be applied (procedure, equipment, etc), are defined. We assume that the probability of detection, p, associated with defects of size a does exist. In the frequentistic interpretation of probability, p can be seen as the number of detected defects divided by the total number of trials, as the total number of trials approaches infinity, of that given class of defects.
We assume that the results of test-piece trials are a sample from a binomial distribution with parameter p. p is an unknown and fixed number in classical and frequentistic statistics, but a random variable in Bayesian statistics. It is natural to choose the Beta distribution to model the uncertainty related to p, as this is conjugate to the binomial distribution and the calculation of posterior distributions becomes particularly simple. Thus: The parameters α and β fully determine the shape of the Beta distribution. In the Bayesian framework, the process starts by expressing the prior knowledge regarding p in the following way: (! prior , " prior ) ......................... 
....(6)
If nothing is known about p before, a reasonable choice for the prior parameters is α prior = 1 and β prior = 1, ie p could be anywhere in the interval [0, 1] with equal probability.
The second step of the process consists of gathering evidence regarding p. The most natural way to do so would be to carry out a number N of practical trials. In doing so, let us assume that the number of successes is N s and the number of failures is N f , so that N=N s +N f . The advantage of choosing a Beta distribution for p comes into play when determining the posterior. It can be shown [9] that the posterior distribution is simply obtained as follows: The essential idea we proposed in [7] follows naturally from these considerations and consists of interpreting the Technical Justification (TJ) in terms of an equivalent set of practical trials. We suggested that the TJ be quantified using two numbers: an equivalent total number of trials, N TJ , and an equivalent number of successes, N TJ,s . Figure 5 schematically illustrates this idea.
The problem is now how to assign meaningful values to the quantities N TJ and N TJ,s . In [7] and [8] we proposed different approaches to tackling this issue. We postulated that the following basic principles should apply: q If some evidence is missing, this should imply less weight for the TJ. This means that the equivalent TJ sample size, N TJ , should be smaller than in the case of stronger evidence. q If evidence is present showing that some defects could be missed, this should imply a lower expected value of the TJ, ie the ratio of N TJ,s over N TJ should be smaller than in the case where the evidence is more convincing regarding detection capability. We also assumed that the TJ can be broken down into a number of elements and that the impact of each element towards demonstrating inspection capability is independent of the others. These elements could be for instance theoretical modelling, experimental evidence, parametric studies, equipment considerations, data analysis, etc.
Having identified such elements, the problem is reduced to determining how convincing each piece of evidence in support of the inspection capability is and what relative weight this evidence would have in the overall justification. We suggested scoring each element with a number between 0 and 1, expressing the degree to which that element supports detection capability. The closer the value is to 1, the better the evidence contained in the TJ element supports the detectability of defects. Further, we proposed that the elements be weighted to reflect the importance of each in the overall justification.
This model was trialled in two pilot qualification exercises, described in the next section.
Pilot qualification exercises
The purpose of the pilot qualification exercise was to study and to demonstrate as far as possible the feasibility of the approaches described above. The study consisted of two distinct qualification exercises. In both, a qualification body (QB) was formed of four experts in the field of qualification, all with recognised international experience.
In the first exercise, a technical justification (TJ) was provided by a nuclear utility. This TJ was only slightly modified for technical and confidentiality reasons. Two variants of the TJ were produced with differing technical content in order to study the sensitivity of the results to TJ content. In the second exercise, a technical justification was provided by a Swedish organisation. This TJ was not from a real application but had been produced as an example of the scope and content of a TJ.
A one-day meeting was organised to train the members in the relevant fields not strictly falling within the expertise areas, such as probability theory, etc.
The application of the direct judgement guidelines was straightforward. There was reasonable consistency between the POD judgements of the individual qualification body members, both at 80% confidence and at 95% confidence.
The use of the relationship between POD and margin of detection was not considered useful for the pilot applications since failure to detect defects was unlikely to be due to low signals. However, this relationship could still be useful when the margin of detection is low, as is often the case for austenitic welds.
The trials of the Bayesian approach highlighted a number of issues. The main issues were: 1) There were different interpretations among the qualification body members of the meanings of TJ element score and weight, and (in the case of the 2nd pilot) widely differing views on the relative weights of the TJ and trials. Careful guidance is required to ensure correct and consistent interpretation and application of the method, and the final guidelines which were developed address these issues as far as practicable. However, it is ultimately a matter of expert judgement as to what scores and weights are attributed, and it is not possible to be prescriptive on this. 2) Ultrasonic detection capability depends on a variety of defect features such as orientation, roughness, location etc. It can be difficult to conclude a POD for the overall defect population without information on the relative likelihoods of different classes of defects being present. TJs and practical trials often concentrate on 'worst case' defects, ie those predicted to be most difficult to detect. Determining POD based solely on these can lead to undue pessimism for the defect population as a whole. It may be appropriate to determine separate PODs for separate populations of defects, but knowledge of the overall POD would still require knowledge of the relative proportions of these populations. 3) Consideration is required regarding whether and how to take account of the margin of detection for defects during trials. In the current methodology, there is no distinction between only just detecting defects in trials, and detecting them very easily (high signal to reporting threshold). 4) The methodology does not address accuracy of sizing (a defect could be detected but not reported if undersized) or how to treat false calls. 
Recommendations and conclusions
The following main recommendations were made at the end of the project [2] : n The developed guidelines provide a good starting point for those considering application of the Bayesian approach. However, further work is recommended to make the application more robust in practice. n Consideration should be given to how to construct a TJ to facilitate quantification. This could involve for example organising the TJ so that the 'stand-alone elements' and 'limiting factors' are explicitly identified and discussed. n It is recommended that the quantification approaches are trialled in parallel with formal qualification exercises on real plant. Even if the quantification data generated are not used for formal purposes, the lessons learnt would be extremely useful.
The sensitivity of risk reduction to the details of the POD curve was investigated based on the use of a simplified POD curve (typically a step curve) to represent inspection effectiveness. Although the model is relatively simple, it provides a useful insight into the conditions under which a step POD curve could be adopted. It also illustrates the extent to which risk is sensitive to the parameters of the POD step function. This approach can help achieve an appropriate balance between risk reduction and the effort involved in designing and qualifying an inspection system. The relation between POD, inspection interval and risk reduction was also studied, applying a model that combines probabilistic crack growth analysis with a discrete Markov process for inspection modelling.
Two pilot qualification studies were performed to demonstrate the application of the quantification methods in practice, and to identify the need for further work and issues to be addressed in the final guidelines. Both pilots were on ferritic welds, so other issues might have arisen in the case of austenitic welds, where there can be additional complications for inspection and qualification.
The trials of the Bayesian approach highlighted a number of issues that require further work or that should at least be drawn to the attention of those who intend applying the methodology. For instance, there were different interpretations among the qualification body members of the meanings of TJ element score and weight, and in one pilot widely differing views on the relative weights of the TJ and trials. Careful guidance is required to ensure correct and consistent interpretation and application of the method.
However, what scores and weights are attributed is ultimately a matter of expert judgement, and it is very difficult to be more prescriptive on this.
Practical guidelines on the application of the quantification methods were produced. The technical approach is explained in detail in [8] , and guidelines for its application are provided in Annex 1 of [2] .
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